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Abstract 
In this paper, I first critique the composition-based view of Yadong Luo and 
John Child for understanding how resource-poor firms survive and thrive. To 
remedy the deficiencies in their perspective, I then propose a dynamic theory 
of compositional advantage and strategy. Here, the compositional advantage 
is redefined as the attractiveness of the composition of the producer’s 
offering in terms of scope and perceived value/price ratio. I identify five ways 
or basic compositional strategies to improve the value/price ratio. A firm may 
have an overall compositional strategy that is composed of some or all of the 
five basic compositional strategies. I argue there are three indispensable key 
success factors for a composition-based competition, i.e., aspiration 
(ambition-position asymmetry), attitude (being ALERT), and action (turning 
asymmetry into advantage). I also discuss the particular relevance of the 
present theory to understanding Chinese firms. I conclude with managerial 
implications and suggestions for future research. 
Keywords: composition, advantage, strategy, value/price ratio, key success 
factor, asymmetry 
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INTRODUCTION 
‘What explains international success and failure of firms’ has been one of the 
fundamental questions for strategy scholarship (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994; 
Schendel, 1991). While this question is concerned about firms in general and their 
success, a more challenging question is concerned about a particular type of firms 
that are lack of resources or with only ordinary resources, namely, how can 
resource-poor firms not only survive but also thrive in today’s global competition? 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) does not fit well with this phenomenon 
because of its emphasis on possession of valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable (VRIN) resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991). This question is 
not well understood (Burton, 2015) as the strategy literature has so far largely 
neglected, with Miller (2003) being a notable exception.  
Recently, Luo and Child (2015) have, independent of Miller (2003), made an 
important contribution by proposing a composition-based view (CBV) of firm 
growth. According to Luo and Child (2015: 379), resource-poor firms ‘may 
generate extraordinary results through their creative use of open resources and 
unique integrating capabilities, resulting in an enhanced speed and a price-value 
ratio that are well suited to large numbers of mass market consumers’. However, 
as Burton (2015) and Volberda & Karali (2015) have commented, there are some 
deficiencies in the current theorization of the CBV, due to which, the full potential 
of the compositional perspective has not yet been tapped. 
In response to Burton’s (2015: 415) comment that ‘There must be more to learn 
and understand about CBV if it is to realize the promise’, in this paper, I build on 
and redefine some elements of Luo and Child’s perspective in order to develop a 
dynamic theory of compositional advantage and strategy that explains the survival 
and success of resource-poor firms. 
In what follows, I first critique the current formulation of the composition-based 
view. As the research gap that motivates my theorization, Luo and Child (2015) 
have left two fundamental questions not sufficiently addressed. One is that, while 
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 many firms, being resource-poor and resource-rich, practice resource composition, 
why some but not others have succeeded? This is the question about the key 
success factors (KSFs) for a composition-based competition. The other is that why 
such a compositional explanation is particularly relevant for understanding the 
survival and success of resource-poor firms from China. To address these two 
questions, I propose a dynamic theory of compositional advantage and strategy. 
To do so, I first redefine the compositional advantage, then unpack the 
compositional strategy, and then explicate the three KSFs for a composition-based 
competition, i.e., aspiration (ambition-position asymmetry), attitude (being 
ALERT1), and action (turning asymmetry into advantage). In the discussion section, 
I address the particular relevance of the compositional perspective to 
understanding how Chinese resource-poor firms survive and thrive. I conclude the 
paper with managerial implications of this theory and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
DEFICIENCIES OF THE COMPOSITION-BASED VIEW 
Albeit being an ‘exciting’ new perspective (Burton, 2015: 413), Luo and Child’s 
current formulation of composition-based view is not without problems (Burton, 
2015; Volberda & Karali, 2015). Here, I identify three deficiencies, including 
unclear positioning of the CBV, an abstract notion of compositional capability, and 
self-imposed constraints on the CBV.  
Unclear Positioning of the Composition-Based View 
There are two aspects of the unclear positioning deficiency. The first is that it is 
unclear whether the composition-based view is a new theory of the firm, firm 
growth or strategy. Although Burton (2015: 416) sees the CBV as a ‘new theory of 
the firm’ and Volberda & Karali (2015) also describe it as ‘the composition-based 
view of the firm’, it is actually not a theory of the firm (TOF) because a theory of 
1 As will be explained later, the acronym of ALERT denotes five attitudes, i.e., being agile, eager to learn, entrepreneurial, 
keen on building relationship and network, or willing to work under tough conditions. 
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the firm must address the fundamental question of why the firm exists at all 
(Coase, 1937). While Luo and Child (2015) do not claim their CBV a theory of the 
firm, they do compare and contrast it with the resource-based view (RBV) and 
knowledge-based view (KBV), both of which have a TOF element. The TOF 
element of the RBV is Conner’s (1991) resource-based theory of the firm as an 
alternative to the opportunism-based transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975). 
The knowledge-based view was initially proposed as an alternative theory of the 
firm to the economic contract approach (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Luo and Child label their perspective a composition-based view of firm growth; 
however, it is doubtful whether it is a new theory of firm growth. There is no 
reference to Penrose’s (1959) classical theory of the growth of the firm in their 
analysis and reference. Surprisingly, the word of ‘growth’ is almost nonexistent in 
the references section except appearing in the titles of two industrial reports, i.e., 
IBM (2007) and KPMG (2012). No wonder why Volberda & Karali (2015:424) 
raised the question: ‘is the compositional strategy a growth strategy, and if so, 
what is growth in this context?’ 
The second aspect of the unclear positioning deficiency is that it is unclear 
whether the CBV is a general theory for all resource-poor firms or a special theory 
for some of them from particular region, e.g., China. Luo and Child (2015: 379) 
choose the domain of their study the firms ‘without the benefit of resource 
advantages, core technology, or market power’. They identify three groups of such 
firms including emerging economy enterprises (EEEs), small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) or latecomer businesses in advanced economies. However, 
their theorization is primarily based on emerging market and especially Chinese 
firms. Volberda & Karali (2015:423) wonder why Luo and Child have focused 
particularly on EEEs because they believe that ‘a theory that is generalizable to 
almost every firm should not be introduced as a theory for a particular context. 
Rather, it should be introduced as a general theory that could later on be shown to 
be applicable particularly to certain specific contexts.’ 
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 To remedy this unclear positioning deficiency, I reposition the composition-based 
view as a theory of competitive advantage and strategy on the one hand, and as a 
general theory for resource-poor firms but most applicable to those from China on 
the other hand. 
An Abstract Notion of Compositional Capability 
As aforementioned, one of the two fundamental questions Luo and Child have not 
sufficiently addressed is that, why have some but not other resource-poor firms 
succeeded in implementing composition-based strategy? In other words, what are 
the key success factors for such a composition-based competition? Luo and 
Child’s (2015: 379) answer is that those successful firms, albeit being resource-
poor, possess a superior compositional capability that over-compensates their 
resource disadvantage and ‘differentiates them from better endowed competitors’.  
According to Luo and Child (2015: 379-380, italics added), such superior 
compositional capabilities enable these firms to combine a set of ordinary 
resources available in the market for purchase ‘in a way that is creatively and 
speedily adaptive to market requirements’ and therefore firms with such 
compositional capabilities are ‘savvy in distinctively composing ordinary resources, 
internal or external, in ways that create specific advantages and a unique 
developmental path for growth’. 
The notion of compositional capability is central to Luo and Child’s CBV. While it is 
common and fashionable to attribute firm success to some kind of superior 
organizational capability, such as absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), 
combinative capability (Kogut & Zander, 1992) dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997), and recombinant capability (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013),  it is a 
risky solution for Luo and Child to heavily rely on an abstract notion of 
compositional capability for two reasons.  
The first is that it may dilute the innovativeness of the composition-based view. 
Precisely, this is why Volberda & Karali (2015: 419) argue the compositional 
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capability should be seen as a type of organizational resource or a subset of 
dynamic capability and therefore the CBV is a special case of the RBV or dynamic 
capability view (DCV) and ‘there is therefore no need for a CBV’. 
The second reason is that relying on an abstract notion of compositional capability 
tends to divert attention away from examining the process and mechanism of how 
resource-poor firms survive and thrive, which is more complex and important than 
any abstract notion of capability can capture. Consequentially, the abstract notion 
of compositional capability may risk becoming a black box at best and even an 
empty notion without substance at worst. Preliminary evidence supporting the risk 
argument is the controversy around the notion of dynamic capability. Namely, 
despite two decades of efforts on explicating dynamic capability (e.g., Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, 2007; Winter, 2003), there is still a 
lack of consensus regarding dynamic capability. As a consequence, Arend & 
Bromiley (2009: 87) have argued that ‘the DCV remain a label with an implied 
coherence it does not possess’. 
To remedy this deficiency, I will forgo the notion of compositional capability without 
denying it serves some purpose, and instead, I choose to explicate the key 
success factors for a composition-based strategy. 
Self-Imposed Constraints on the Composition-Based Strategy 
Luo and Child have paid insufficient attention to the evolution of compositional 
capability so that Volberda and Karali ( 2015: 424) raise the question of ‘how 
important is time in this concept’. The time dimension is important because without 
it some critical questions will remain unanswered. For example, is the 
compositional capability a unitary or multifaceted phenomenon? Do the resource-
poor firms possess such a compositional capability from the beginning? Does such 
a compositional capability change its content or/and form over time? Are there 
some compositional capabilities better than others in terms of quality or power? 
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 Although Luo and Child (2015: 402) briefly touch upon the time issue by arguing 
‘As a firm expands and diversifies, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain a 
compositional approach’, such a constraint on the composition-based strategy is in 
my view self-imposed. Another self-imposed drawback of the composition-based 
strategy is what Luo and Child’s (2015: 401) state, ‘When other firms follow this 
model and are able to do the same, composition-based competitive advantages 
will dissipate or disappear’.  
Luo and Child have overemphasized on ordinary and external resources in 
composition, temporary competitive advantage derived from composition, 
distinction between economic rent-generating capability and compositional 
capability. These emphases are in my view are not necessarily the prerequisites 
for building a compositional perspective, and therefore, the constraints and 
drawbacks, as cautioned by Luo and Child, of using the composition-based 
strategy are indeed self-imposed.  
To remedy this deficiency, I will explicitly bring in the time dimension on the one 
hand, and forgo the notion of compositional capability on the other. These two 
choices necessitate my developing a dynamic theory of compositional advantage 
and strategy, which now I turn to. 
 
A THEORY OF COMPOSITIONAL ADVANTAGE AND STRATEGY 
Redefining the Compositional Advantage 
The key insight of Luo and Child’s (2015: 380) perspective is that the resource-
poor firms ‘achieve a compositional advantage, however, by creatively combining 
these elements to generate impressive speed and efficiency, and particularly to 
develop superior price-value ratios (i.e., higher value provided to customers per 
unit of price or cost).’ 
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However, it is unclear from Luo and Child’s argument what the essence of the 
compositional advantage is. Is it impressive speed and efficiency or superior price-
value ratio or both? There are two unsettled issues in Luo and Child’s argument. 
The first is the paradox of impressive speed. For ordinary consumers, the 
producer’s speed of new product development may not be a good thing for them 
because it means the products purchased now will soon become obsolete with the 
risk that the replacement components may soon be out of supply. However, for the 
industrial buyers, the producer’s speed for both delivery and new product 
development is a very important factor in purchasing decision-making because 
fast delivery means reducing waiting costs and new innovative products available 
means they can upgrade their technologies in order to stay competitive. Compared 
to ordinary consumers, industrial buyers more afford to buy new products to 
replace the old ones because their long-term suppliers may give discounts on the 
replacement projects. So, while impressive speed may not be good for ordinary 
consumers, it is highly valued by industrial buyers. To avoid this paradox, I clearly 
distinguish impressive speed and superior price-value ratio as two separate 
sources of competitiveness while simultaneously unify them by the notion of 
compositional advantage. I redefine the compositional advantage as the 
attractiveness of the composition of the producer’s offering, being product or 
service or both, which include two aspects of composition-based attractiveness. 
The first aspect is the composition of value and price, i.e., the price-value or 
value/price ratio2; the second is the composition of product offerings targeting 
different market segments. In this redefinition, the speed of new product 
development is connected to the possibility of a wide range of product offerings 
2 There is a distinction between price and cost. The cost of an offering, being product or service or both, is all expenses that 
have actually incurred for making that offering available for customers to purchase, including materials, manufacturing, 
administration, marketing and delivery, etc., while the price of an offering can be strategically set taking into consideration of 
the actual cost as well as strategy for winning competition. While the value is customer’s perception, the cost is producer’s 
private information. So, one can only estimate a competitor’s actual cost according to its price. For a company, it is easy to 
improve value/price ratio by strategically setting the price low without reducing the real cost or adding more value or both. 
But, for long-term success sake, any company needs to actually reduce its real cost or/and add more value. To avoid the 
complication, I use value/price ratio and value/cost ratio interchangeably her. 
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 from which many potential customers can possibly find something matching their 
expectations. 
In strategy literature, the value/price ratio as an analytical tool has been used by 
other scholars. For instance, D’Aveni (1994) uses the perceived quality/price ratio 
to explain how companies can outmanoeuvre competitors by improving the ratio. 
Bowman (1998: 21) also uses the notion of ‘value for money’ which is about the 
ratio of perceived use value over perceived price to explain the strategic choices of 
a firm. The value/price ratio is also a useful tool in many other contexts. For 
instance, Hardin (1982) emphasizes that the difficulties of collective action depend 
partly on the ratio of costs to benefits when analysing the n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma; and Libecap (1989) comes to a similar conclusion that the ratio of 
benefits to costs determines the success of efficient property rights formation (both 
cited in North, 1990, p. 13).  
The second deficiency in Luo and Child’s notion of superior price-value ratio is that 
they have neglected the distinction between the quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions of the price-value ratio. In so doing, it is unclear what they mean by 
‘superior’ price-value ratio. A ratio is a numeric value, which naturally implies it 
being quantitative in nature. However, there are diverse ways of achieving a same 
numeric level of price-value ratio. The question is whether the same numeric price-
value ratios achieved by different ways are different in quality. In the present 
conceptualization of compositional advantage, their qualities are different, 
explained in more detail in the next section. 
Unpacking the Compositional Strategy 
Conceptualizing a superior value/price ratio as the essence of the compositional 
advantage gives rise to an unavoidable question, namely, what is the relationship 
between the notion of compositional advantage/strategy and Porter’s (1980, 1985) 
notion of generic competitive advantages/strategies?  
9 
 
With regard to generic advantage part of the question, my answer is that the 
notion of compositional advantage is more general or unifying than Porter’s two 
generic competitive advantages, i.e., low cost and differentiation, because the they 
can be seen as two particular representations of compositional advantage. Simply, 
both low cost and differentiation advantages can be understood as a particular 
form of superior value/price ratio.  
There are five different ways to improve the value/price ratio and hence to gain a 
compositional advantage. (1) The first is to reduce cost, which enables a lower 
price, at the sacrifice of some level of quality or value of the producer’s offering, 
compared to its previous offering or the competitors’. As long as the cost reduction 
is proportionally larger than the loss of perceived quality or value, the overall 
value/price ratio is improved. (2) The second is to reduce the cost while keeping 
quality or value constant or on a par with those of the competitors’ offerings. (3) 
The third is to add more value with some level of higher cost incurred. As long as 
the value adding is proportionally larger than the extra cost incurred, the overall 
value/price ratio is improved. (4) The fourth is to add more value while keeping 
cost constant or on a par with those of the competitors’ (indicated by competitors’ 
prices). (5) The fifth is to simultaneously add more value while further reduce the 
cost3.  
When it comes to generic strategies, Porter (1980) initially asserted that the cost 
leadership and differentiation strategies are incompatible and cannot be pursued 
simultaneously. Later Porter (1985: 18) conceded that ‘reducing cost does not 
always involve a sacrifice in differentiation’ and ‘sometimes making an activity 
unique also simultaneously lowers cost’ (ibid.: 129). Then, he made a compromise 
that ‘sometimes a firm may be able to create two largely separate business units 
within the same corporate entity, each with a different generic strategy’ (ibid.: 17). 
However, it was Porter’s (1996: 77) belief that the two generic strategies are 
largely incompatible and that in order to contain the risk of the combination effort, 
3 The idea of the five ways of improving value/cost ratio was originally presented in a conference paper written by the author 
in 2007. The Figure 1 is adapted from the original figure presented in the conference paper. 
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 corporations have to create standalone business units, ‘each with its own brand 
name and tailored activities’. 
Porter’s assertion arose many criticisms and some scholars have provided 
solutions to the possibility of combining the two generic strategies (e.g., Campbell-
Hunt, 2000; Cronshaw, Davis, & Kay, 1994; D’Aveni, 1994; Hill, 1988; Markides & 
Charitou, 2004; Miller & Friesen, 1986; Mintzberg, 1988;  Murray, 1988; Parnell, 
1997; White, 1986). Probably, as a response to those criticisms, Porter (2001: 70) 
started to accommodate the combination argument by stating that the only way to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage is ‘by operating at a lower cost, by 
commanding a premium price, or by doing both’. Yet, Thornhill and White (2007) 
have made a counterargument in favor of pure rather than hybrid/combinative 
strategy. Porter has recently once again stated, to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage, ‘a company must be able to differentiate itself and thus command a 
price premium, operate at a lower cost than its rivals, or both’ (Porter & 
Heppelmann, 2014: 14). However, Porter has never explained how such a ‘doing 
both’ strategy can be done.  
Li, Worm and Xie (2015) have identified several types of solution to the both/and 
question regarding the generic strategy debate. In agreement with Li et al.’s (2015) 
typology, the present theory of compositional strategy tackles the both/and 
challenge by adopting the dimensionalization and selective integration approaches. 
The dimensionalization approach here is to divide the concepts of cost and 
differentiation into multiple sub-elements. Mintzberg (1988) dimensionalizes the 
concept of differentiation into several types, namely, differentiation by marketing 
image, product design, quality, support, and undifferentiation. Likewise, I 
dimensionalize the concept of cost into different elements, e.g., material cost, 
labor cost, functionality cost4, marketing cost, and administrative cost, etc. The 
selective integration approach here means that, a compositional strategy can 
simultaneously attend to both cost/price and differentiation/value considerations by 
4 For many products, such as consumer electronics, there are many functions or features that can be added or removed. To 
cut cost, some unnecessary functions can be removed (see Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). 
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selectively integrating their respective sub-elements with the aim of achieving a 
compositional advantage measured by a higher value/price ratio compared to the 
focal firm’s previous offering or/and its rivals’. 
With this compositional solution in mind, it is easy to relate the five ways to 
improve value/price ratio, which can be called five basic compositional strategies, 
to Porter’s two generic strategies. In Figure 1, there are four square-shape cells. I 
label them cost reduction, transition, differentiation, and combination, respectively. 
Except transition, the other three can be seen as three generic strategies, in 
consistence with Porter latest thinking.  
The four square-shape cells are further divided into two triangle sub-cells. I label 
six of all eight sub-cells by a number with the other two labelled with ‘?’ marks. 
These numbers denote the five basic compositional strategies aforementioned. 
The number ‘0’ implies a starting point, namely, some new firms, being resource-
poor or -rich, may desire to achieve a combination of low cost and differentiation 
advantages, however, they may soon realize it is very difficult, if not completely 
impossible, to start with such an ambitious strategy. For resource-poor firms, the 
most viable strategy in pursuit of survival is the aforementioned first strategy, i.e., 
to reduce cost, which enables a lower price, at the sacrifice of some level of quality 
or value of the producer’s offering. As long as a higher value/price ratio is 
achieved, it is a viable strategy. A firm adopting this first strategy is labelled here a 
cost leader. Inspired by Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow (1978), I label the firms 
adopting the other four compositional strategies as cost defender, distinctor, 
differentiator, and combinator.  
The bold open circle or spiral arrow in Figure 1 denotes there is an ascending 
order along the arrow in terms of the qualitative value of the value/price ratio these 
five basic compositional strategies can generate even if their respective ratios 
have a same numeric value. Accordingly, the present theory of compositional 
strategy describes and prescribes a strategic development path for resource-poor 
firms to follow. Namely, although all of the five compositional strategies are viable 
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 in generating superior value/price ratio, they are qualitatively different; while it is 
easier or more natural for resource-poor firms to start with cost reduction strategy 
in general and cost leadership in particular, these firms need to transit from cost 
reduction to differentiation and ultimately to combination, if they want to not only 
survive but also thrive. 
The transition cell denotes the situation where the effort to further reduce cost may 
cause a higher proportion of loss of perceived quality or value and therefore 
decrease the value/price ratio; or the effort to add more value will incur higher 
proportion of extra cost incurred therefore decrease the value/price ratio. 
Transition has some resemblance to Porter’s (1980) notion of ‘struck in the middle’ 
and Miles and Snow’s (1978) notion of ‘reactor’, yet, transition in the present 
theory of compositional strategy can also be a transitional phase between cost 
reduction strategy and differentiation strategy, meaning, the transiting firm may not 
be stuck in the middle for ever but ultimately move up to the next level. 
 
Figure 1. Five compositional strategies to improve value/cost ratio 
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Notes: (1) The dark color arrows indicate whether the primary focus is 
on reducing more cost or adding more value; while the gray color ones 
indicate they are secondary focus. (2) The double arrows indicate a 
higher percentage of change compared to a single arrow. (3) The 
horizontal arrow indicates no change or being on a par with the rival 
offerings. (4) The up arrow indicates an increase while the down arrow 
a decrease. (5) The dash line arrows indicate whether the resulted 
value/cost ratio is higher or lower than before. (6) The bold open circle 
or spiral arrow indicates an ascending order along the arrow in terms of 
qualitative value of the same numeric value/price ratio. 
 
The present theory of compositional strategy is also different from Bowman’s 
(1998, 2003) ‘strategy clock’ model, albeit some resemblance. Bowman argues 
that there are many different directions a firm can deliberately choose to either 
compete on price or add perceived use value, or do both simultaneously. In 
contrast, I describe and prescribe a sequential strategic development path along 
which a resource-poor firm may likely go through over time. 
A new addition to Luo and Child’s (2015) composition-based view here is that, 
based on my aforementioned redefinition of compositional advantage that has two 
meanings, I posit, there is a second meaning of ‘compositional’ in the present 
theory of compositional strategy, namely, the above analysed five compositional 
strategies are in fact basic or elementary strategies, and therefore, companies can 
selectively combine some or all of these five basic compositional strategies to form 
their overall compositional strategy. The rationale for this overall composition is 
that there are different market segments, each of which has different needs and 
wants. Consequently, there is no ‘one size for all’ strategy, and therefore, in order 
to appeal to customers in different market segments companies can or should 
selectively combine some or all of the five basic compositional strategies. In 
practice, companies such as L’Oreal, Nestle, General Motors and Alibaba own 
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 different brands and adopt different compositional strategies for different market 
segments. 
This double meaning of compositional advantage and strategy resolves a widely-
critiqued asymmetry between Porter’s (1980, 1985) two generic competitive 
advantages, i.e., low cost and differentiation, and three generic strategies, i.e., 
cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. It has long been pointed out (e.g., 
Mathur, 1988; Mintzberg, 1988), the focus strategy is about the choice of width of 
targeted market segment while cost leadership and differentiation are choices of 
generic strategies made after the market segment is chosen. Therefore, the focus 
strategy is not a generic strategy. Indeed, except the focus item, the other two 
generic strategies correspond on a one-to-one basis to the two generic 
competitive advantages. By redefining the notion of compositional advantage to 
have two meanings, one about the scope of product offerings and the other the 
value/price ratio of each offering, I have made possible that the notion of 
compositional strategy also has two meanings, one being the scope of the overall 
composition strategy and the other the five basic or elementary compositional 
strategies. In this way, the redefined notions of compositional advantage and 
compositional strategy correspond to each other on a one-to-one basis. 
It is worth noting the present theory sees a wide scope of product offering a 
compositional advantage, which contradicts Porter’s (1980) prescription of a focus 
strategy as a generic strategy. The wide scope of offering argument can even 
further extended to the choice of scope of industries, i.e., scope of diversification. 
While Western strategy literature, after Rumelt’s (1974) study on diversification, in 
general does not favour unrelated diversification, business groups or 
conglomerates who invest in multiple unrelated industries are still very common in 
emerging markets. Khanna and Palepu (1997), adopting an institutional 
perspective, have analyzed why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging 
markets. The present theory of compositional strategy may shed some extra light 
on this contrast.  
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Key Success Factors for a Composition-Based Competition  
Resource-poor firms have a disadvantage in resource endowment compared to 
resource-rich firms. We can call this disadvantage the resource asymmetry, 
namely, the focal firm and its rivals are in an asymmetric relationship in terms of 
possession of resources or capabilities. This resource asymmetry is common for 
new ventures in general and those from emerging markets or developing 
economies in particular. To survive, the resource-poor firms must develop some 
kinds of competitive advantage to compensate their resource asymmetry 
disadvantage.  
Understanding above analyzed compositional advantage helps resource-poor 
firms realize that there are many ways of building such compensating advantages. 
For instance, to improve the value/cost ratio of the product/service offering, the 
resource-poor firms can choose the aforementioned first basic compositional 
strategy, i.e., ruthlessly reducing costs at the sacrifice of some level of quality or 
value. They can concentrate their efforts on some sub-elements of cost, such as 
material and functionality costs. As long as the overall value/price ratio is superior 
to some competitors’, this strategy gives the focal firm a competitive advantage to 
compensate its resource asymmetry disadvantage. In this way, the focal firm can 
attract some customers and therefore survive. The resource-poor firms can also 
build a compensating advantage of a wide scope of product/service offering. They 
can selectively combine different sub-elements of cost and differentiation in order 
to offer various products/services that have various compositions of value and cost 
elements. These various product/service offerings help the focal firm meet the 
needs and wants of different market segments, more than a standard offering of a 
competitor can.  
Yet, understanding compositional advantage and adopting a compositional 
strategy do not guarantee survival and success of the resource-poor firm because 
other firms may have understood and adopted the same logic. So, a question that 
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 arises immediately is what enables the resource-poor firms to survive and thrive in 
a composition-based competition.  
Addressing this challenging question, Miller (2003:964) proposes an asymmetry-
based view of advantage (ABV). Miller defines asymmetry as ‘skills, process, 
talents, or outputs an organization possesses or produces’ that are not clearly 
valuable or even troublesome but potentially valuable if creatively used. Such 
asymmetries initially appear to be weakness rather than strength. According to 
Miller, if asymmetries are creatively discovered, utilized and transformed, many 
firms may start with little and end up with a lot. Miller’s insight is echoed by Luo 
and Child (2015), albeit without referring to it.  
While asymmetry in Miller’s ABV is primarily about organizational resource and 
capability, I expand the notion of asymmetry to include more meanings. The 
rationale for this expansion is that in order for resource-poor firms to survive and 
thrive, there must be something to compensate or overcome this initial resource 
asymmetry disadvantage. This ‘something’ may be aspiration-, attitude-, or effort-
related, or all of them. Accordingly, I redefine the notion of asymmetry to include 
three aspects. The first is the ambition-position asymmetry, meaning the firm has 
set an ambition higher than its current position. The second is the attitude 
asymmetry toward competition between the firm and its rivals. The third is the 
potential advantage-deriving asymmetry, i.e., Miller’s concept of asymmetry.  
These three types of asymmetry are in turn linked to three key success factors for 
a composition-based competition or an asymmetry-based strategy (see Figure 2), 
i.e., aspiration (ambition-position asymmetry), attitude (being asymmetrically more 
ALERT), and action (turning asymmetry into advantage). 
First, the resource-poor firm must aspire to survive and thrive, namely, it must 
have a higher ambition than its current position in the competition. The gap or 
asymmetry between its ambition and position serves as a motivation or healthy 
tension to ameliorate its situation. The asymmetry can be set large or small. In 
general, the larger the asymmetry is set, the higher the motivation is generated for 
17 
 
the firm. Some firms set very large asymmetries, a situation called stretch goal 
setting that stretches employees’ abilities to new levels (Thompson, Hochwarter, & 
Mathys, 1997). Some Japanese firms have been able to capitalize on such a 
strategic intent and become successful internationally (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005). 
However, too large an ambition-position asymmetry may turn out to be the source 
of frustration when the firm fails to achieve its ambition for extended period of time.  
Therefore, it is important to be pragmatic when it comes to ambition or goal setting. 
Pragmatism here means incrementalism or gradualism. Namely, a resource-poor 
firm may set a moderate asymmetry at the early stage of its development and 
incrementally adjust it until it has accumulated sufficient resources, capabilities 
and confidence; and by then, it can make a leap in setting its level of aspiration 
(Lewin et al., 1944). 
Second, the resource-poor firm must have a pragmatic and positive attitude 
toward competition. It must be agile, eager to learn, entrepreneurial, keen on 
building relationship and network, or willing to work under tough conditions, or all 
of them (ALERT for short hereafter)5. Being more ALERT than its competitors, a 
reverse asymmetry, gives the resource-poor firms an attitude advantage that to 
some degree compensates its initial resource asymmetry disadvantage. 
Resource-rich firms may be more bureaucratic and less agile or flexible. They may 
be too inert to learn or inclined to exploitative rather than explorative learning 
(March, 1991). They may be less entrepreneurial due to their mature business 
models. They may care less about the needs and wants of customers because of 
the latter’s weak bargaining power. Their employees may not be willing to work 
under tough conditions, such as working in harsh environment, staying far away 
from family, or working overtime for an extended period, simply because the 
formal regulations and social norm of work-life balance do not support such work 
5 The author gratefully acknowledges the comments on the ALERT idea made by Jens Gammelgaard of Copenhagen 
Business School, Denmark and Judith Zhu of University of Newcastle, Australia. 
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 practices. All these attitude asymmetries provide a golden opportunity for 
resource-poor firms to survive as long as they can take advantage of them. 
Third, to survive and thrive, the resource-poor firms, besides having the attitude 
asymmetry advantage, must put continuous efforts to turn the resource and 
attitude asymmetries into compositional advantage. Miller (2003) identifies four 
ways of discovering advantage-generating asymmetries, including, experimenting, 
reconceptualizing non-productive assets, paradox of weakness, and building on 
budding capabilities. Creating asymmetry-based initial advantage as described by 
Miller helps the resource-poor firm to gain a foothold in the market and therefore 
survive the competition.  
To thrive, the survived firm must continuously upgrade its compositional 
advantage to a higher level. To do so, the firm has to continuously investing in 
resource and capability accumulation. This is because, a higher level of aspiration 
sometimes necessitates an even higher level of possession of resources and 
capabilities; and a firm may need to build some organizational slack for innovation 
or in preparation for emerging opportunities (Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria & Gulati, 
1996). Also, the firm has to promptly adapt to the changing internal and external 
environment. The external environment may become different soon as the firm 
survives because in the past it is the firm’s own struggle for survival without much 
recognition made and attention paid by the incumbents but now since it has 
survived it starts to be seen as a potential threat by more competitors. The 
survived firm has to adapt to such change in the external competitive environment. 
Internally, with its survival, the firm now starts to accumulate more resources such 
as employees and capabilities. It has to adapt its organizational structure, routines 
and human resource management, etc. The more the firm grow, the more 
challenges, internal and external, the firm will face, which demands more reactive 
or proactive efforts. 
These three KSFs are indispensable for a composition-based competition. High 
aspiration provides the motivation for not only survival but also catching-up and 
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even leapfrogging the resource-rich rivals. However, having a high aspiration is 
not enough; to survive, the resource-poor  firm must to be more ALERT, an 
attitude asymmetry that gives it a competitive edge. To catch-up or even to 
leapfrog its resource-rich rivals, the survived firm must continuously upgrade its 
compositional advantage in order to adapt to new environment, external and 
internal. Over time, the firm evolves and may no longer be resource-poor. The 
growth of the firm may in turn impact on the firm’s aspiration for the future. With 
more resources and capabilities, the firm may gain more confidence and therefore 
raise its aspiration. To realize the new aspiration, the firm has to be more ALEART 
in attitude and continuously act to meet new challenges ahead. Therefore, the 
cycle of aspiration-attitude-action continues. 
 
Figure 2. Three key success factors for a composition-based competition 
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 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Particular Relevance to Chinese Firms 
In forming the composition-based view, Luo and Child (2015) was originally 
motivated to investigate the unique competitive and growth strategies of Chinese 
privately owned firms that compete domestically, regionally, and globally. Their 
analysis is largely based on the Chinese cases although the CBV can be applied 
to many other firms including SMEs from advanced countries. This gives rise to 
Volberda & Karali’s (2015) critique that the CBV should be positioned as a general 
theory with particular application to certain specific contexts. In response to 
Volberda & Karali’s suggestion, I have above proposed a general theory of 
compositional advantage and strategy that may have particular relevance to 
Chinese firms.  
From the cases analyzed by Luo and Child (2015), we can see the present theory 
is particularly applicable to Chinese firms as many today’s successful Chinese 
companies, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Lenovo, Haier, Sany, Galanz, Wanxiang, 
BYD, CIMC, Pearl River Piano, and HiSense (Luo & Child, 2015; Williamson & 
Zeng, 2009; Zeng & Williamson, 2007), were once resource-poor firms, yet they 
have managed to survive and thrive precisely on the basis of superior value/cost 
ratio and composition of product/service offerings that satisfy needs and wants of 
different market segments.  
A close examination of this group of Chinese firms reveals that they all have 
embraced the three key success factors. Namely, they are extremely aspirational. 
Most of them had the stretch goal of becoming a Global 500 company in their early 
stage of internationalization. They are extremely ALERT even if they have reached 
a very high level of achievement. They give skill and advantage upgrading a high 
priority. No wonder why there have emerged quite many Chinese multinationals 
aggressively investing in global market. Many of Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment are strategy-asset seeking (Dunning, 1998). So, the question is what 
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explains Chinese firms’ active and proactive pursuit of such a composition-based 
competition. I posit, there are at least a cultural reason and a psychological one. 
Culturally, Chinese have a make-do mentality. There is an idiom of turning the 
rotten into the magic (化腐朽为神奇), which precisely corresponds to the CBV that 
is about creatively combining ordinary resources to get superior performance. 
Chinese often say that three shoe repairers with their wits combined equal Zhuge 
Liang, a master mind (三个臭皮匠顶个诸葛亮). There are many other sayings and 
teaching that correspond to some essential ideas of the compositional perspective. 
For instance, a Confucian teaching is that every man has a share of responsibility 
for the fate of his country (天下兴亡匹夫有责), which can be linked to the 
aspiration factor. Chinese believe that poverty gives rise to a desire for change (穷
则思变), which can be linked to the ALERT attitude. Another saying is that when 
sailing against the current not to advance is to go back (逆水行舟不进则退), which 
can be linked to the imperiative of upgrading or advancement.  
Of course, other countries may also have equivalent idioms and sayings like the 
Chinese ones. So culture alone cannot provide a full answer to the 
aforementioned question. A psychological reason complements the cultural one. 
Chinese people in general have a ‘victim mentality’ due to the government’s 
‘persistent emphasis on China’s “150 years of shame and humiliation” as the main 
lens through which Chinese view their place in modern international affairs’ 
(Medeiros & Fravel, 2003: 32). As a result of such a victim mentality, many 
aspirational entrepreneurs have voluntarily shouldered the responsibility of 
reviving China through industrial development. Many companies, large or small, 
have had a dream of becoming a Global 500 firm. In addition, the past three and 
half decades of opening and reform have fashioned Deng Xiaoping’s philosophy of 
pragmatism and gradualism and his notion of ‘to get rich is glorious’. The 
pragmatism enables Chinese resource-poor firms to make do with what they have 
at hand. The gradualism reminds Chinese entrepreneurs to adopt a step by step 
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 plan in pursuit of their aspirations. The notion of getting rich is glorious helps 
release Chinese entrepreneurial spirit. 
Managerial Implications 
The implication of the present theory for resource-poor firms in general and those 
from emerging markets in particular are that, they should not have a sense of 
inferiority and give up on themselves. Instead, they should have a high aspiration 
yet be down to the earth, adopt an ALERT attitude toward competition, and 
proactively make efforts to continuously upgrade their resources, capabilities and 
compositional advantages. To be pragmatic, they may start with competing at the 
bottom of the pyramid (BOP) (Prahalad, 2006), while gradually move upward to 
the middle and top of the pyramid. This is not to deny the possibility of an 
accelerated pace of growth, which can be done by aggressive merger and 
acquisition (M&A). However, resource-poor firms should be aware of the high risk 
in M&A and especially cross-border M&A. 
The implications of the present theory for advanced country firms in general and 
large MNEs in particular are that, they should not look down the resource-poor 
firms from developing countries simply because of their current low positions. They 
should not ignore the BOP where many hidden opportunities exist. They should 
also pay attention to those emerging challengers from emerging markets because 
they may be extremely ALERT. The successful firms should critically examine their 
internal organizations to make sure they are not to become too bureaucratic and 
inert.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
The ideas presented in this paper are largely conceptual or theoretical. There is a 
need of empirical studies in the future to verify or/and enrich the theory. For 
example, we can examine whether the strategic development path described or 
prescribed has been followed by resource-poor firms, under what conditions these 
firms switch from one stage to the next stage, whether these firms do combine 
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several basic compositional strategies in their overall compositional strategies, the 
factors that influence their aspiration levels or goal setting decisions, and different 
approaches to skill and advantage upgrading. 
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